Abstract. We show that the attack of Wiener on RSA cryptosystems with a short deciphering exponent extends to systems using other groups such as elliptic curves, and Luc.
Introduction. Wiener 1] showed that the RSA cryptosystem has a weakness if the private deciphering exponent is chosen too small relative to the modulus. In this note we observe that the attack extends to other systems based on groups whose order modulo p is close to p: for example, systems based on elliptic curves and the Luc system.
Wiener's attack on RSA.
Suppose that N = pq is the modulus for an RSA cryptosystem where p and q are primes of the same order of magnitude. The enciphering exponent, or public key, e and deciphering exponent, or secret key, d are related by de 1 mod lcmfp ? 1 and so e=N will have k=hd as a continued fraction approximant under precisely the same conditions as before.
We conclude that care should be taken in designing the parameters of a Luc cryptosystem to ensure that all the deciphering exponents are of the same length as the modulus.
Extension to elliptic curve cryptosystems.
The use of elliptic curves in cryptography was proposed by Miller 9] : see Menezes 10 ] for a survey of this area. We refer to Cassels 11] or Silverman 12] for background on elliptic curves.
We shall study two extensions of the RSA system using elliptic curves. Koyama, Maurer, Okamoto and Vanstone 13] (KMOV) propose using the elliptic curve E(0; b) with equation Y 2 = X 3 + b modulo N = pq where p and q are both congruent to 2 mod 3. In this case, since E(0; b) is supersingular modulo each prime, the order of E(0; b) modulo p is p + 1 and modulo q it is q + 1: hence the order of any point in the group of E(0; b) modulo N is a factor of L = lcmfp + 1; q + 1g.
The so that k hd will be recoverable as a continued fraction approximant if d is of order at most N 1=8 .
Kuwakado and Koyama 15] propose using the special form elliptic curves E(a; 0) and E(0; b) modulo N = pq with no restriction on the two prime factors. If b = 0 and p q 3 modulo 4, or a = 0 and p q 2 modulo 3, then the elliptic curve is supersingular modulo p and q, and the attack proceeds as in the KMOV case. Otherwise, we can regard this as a special case of the Demytko system.
Conclusions.
We have shown that the Wiener attack on short private keys in the RSA cryptosystem extends to the Luc system and to two proposed systems based on elliptic curves. In the case of Luc, the four private keys should all be of length at least one quarter that of the modulus; in the KMOV elliptic curve system, the private key should be of length at least one quarter that of the modulus; and in the Demytko elliptic curve system, the four private keys should be of length one eighth that of the modulus.
